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INTRODUCTION
In what has become a common refrain in the investing community, a
recent Wall Street Journal headline reads: “Where Have All the Public
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Companies Gone?”1 Since 1996, the number of public companies has fallen
from 7,322 to 3,671.2 According to a recent survey of 315 public-company
chief financial officers, the average total cost of an initial public offering
(“IPO”) is $4.2 million.3 In addition, the cost of remaining a public company
is more than $1 million annually.4 Due to the cost-inhibitive process and the
maze of regulations that accompany access to public markets, many early stage
companies choose to pursue private funding.5
As startup ventures become increasingly prevalent in the digital
economy, capital demand for those entities has sharply increased.6 To remain
relevant players in the global economy, startups must increase their operating
scale quickly, a reality that demands ready access to substantial capital.7 While
the United States federal government has developed several innovative statutes
and regulations in an effort to ensure corporate mobility and efficient capital
management, state securities laws, commonly known as “blue sky laws,” often
substantially impede startups’ capital acquisition.8
In a private offering, a corporation raises funds by issuing restricted
securities, which are sold to investors without being registered on a publicly
traded exchange and thereafter cannot be freely transferred.9 Because
restricted securities are often shares of unproven companies and used by those
* JD-MBA 2020 Michigan State University College of Law
1
See Jason M. Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-thepublic-companies-gone-1510869125.
2
Id.
3
Considering an IPO to fuel your company’s future?, PRICE WATERHOUSE
COOPER, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2020).
4
Id.
5
See generally Jeremy Abelson & Ben Narasin, Why Are Companies
Staying Private Longer?, BARRON’S (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-are-companies-staying-private-longer1444411528 (last visited Feb 16, 2020).
6
Sramana Mitra, How Startups Overcome the Capital Gap, HARV. BUS.
REV. (July 10, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/07/how-startups-overcome-the-capi.
7
See Eliot Brown, More Venture Capital Money Is Going into Fewer
Startup Deals, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/moreventure-capital-money-is-going-into-fewer-startup-deals1541944089?ns=prod/accounts-wsj.
8
Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., The Case for Federal Preemption of State
Blue Sky Laws, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 18, 2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/18/the-case-for-federal-preemption-ofstate-blue-sky-laws/.
9
See Private Placements, Explained, FINRA (July 1, 2015),
https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/private-placements-explained (last visited
Feb. 16, 2020).
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entities as means for raising capital, they often raise relatively small amounts
of capital.10 While a restricted offering is substantially cheaper than a public
offering, its costs can still be prohibitively expensive and can require extensive
use of professionals, such as investment bankers, securities attorneys, and
public accountants.11 When large entities seek to raise funding by the
prescribed mechanisms, they nearly always possess the financial capabilities
to hire the requisite professionals to navigate both federal and state securities
regulations.12 However, due to the early stage of their business cycle, startups
are less likely to have such financial means and are therefore unlikely to access
the capital necessary to grow.13 While Congress has instituted several acts to
encourage startup growth, blue sky regulation often stymies these attempts.14
10

See Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli & Vladimir Ivanov, CapitalRaising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings,
2009–2017, U.S. S.E.C. Div. ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS (Aug. 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf.
11
See Akhilesh Ganti, Private Placement, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateplacement.asp (last visited Feb. 17,
2020).
12
See id.
13
See Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., Chapter 6: The Case for Federal PreEmption of State Blue Sky Laws, HERITAGE FOUND.,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/201702/06_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter06.pdf.,
In all cases, the registration requirements of state blue sky laws
amount to economic waste, generating costs without any economic benefit.
These state registration requirements, however, have been especially
debilitating on small businesses in need of external capital. The reason that
the harmful effects of state registration provisions fall disproportionately on
small businesses is due principally to the structural and economic
circumstances that small businesses face when they attempt to access external
capital. Small businesses usually seek relatively small amounts of external
capital . . . [t]he yield from small offerings simply will not support the fees
required by competent and honest financial intermediation. For example, in
my research, I found that only 5.8 percent of Regulation D offerings of $1
million or less reported having any financial intermediation.
Id.
14
See Ruthford B. Campbell Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The
Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, Ohio St.
Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 287, 301 (2012).
Briefly stated, high offering costs generally prevent small issuers
from raising their external capital through registered offerings of their
securities. Regulation A offerings have fallen into nearly total disuse, due
principally to the impact of state blue sky laws. Offerings under section 4(2)
are limited to sophisticated offerees and purchasers and apparently require
access to or disclosure of the same information that would be required in a
registration
statement .
.
.
[f]inally,
offerings
under
the
intrastate exemption provided by Rule 147 are restricted to a single state,
which inhibits any broad search for capital.
Id.
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This comment explores the utility of blue sky laws in the ever-evolving digital
economy. Due to the discriminatory and burdensome requirements of blue sky
laws, which restrict access to capital acquisition by startups, this comment
considers whether the value these laws add offsets any stymying of capital
acquisition for startups.
Section I examines the global opportunities available to startups in the
digital economy and how startups’ capital demands evolved in the new era of
business.15 Section II analyzes the differences between merit-based securities
regulation existing at the state level and disclosure-based regulation, which is
the federal regulatory scheme.16 This Section provides an overview of the three
most common methods of restricted securities registration at the state level.17
Section III examines the development of blue sky laws and the role states
originally played in protecting investors.18 This Section further explores the
evolving relationship between state and federal securities regulation, as federal
lawmakers sought to make securities regulation more conducive to corporate
activity and growth, while state securities regulators seek to remain relevant.19
Section IV examines the economic efficiency of a singular regulatory
body in comparison to the current dual regulatory system in the United
States.20 Section IV also analyzes Congress’s recent trend in encouraging
looser capital acquisition, which substantially diminished states’ regulatory
purview.21 The Comment concludes by recommending that, due to significant
investor protections inherent in the federal regulatory framework and the
discriminatory effect that the blue sky law framework imposes on startups,
blue sky laws should be subjected to a blanket preemption by federal securities
statutes.22
I.

EVOLVING CAPITAL NEEDS FOR STARTUPS IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY

An increasingly interconnected global and international economy,
fueled by increased internet use across the world, enables startups in the United
States to compete not only nationally but also internationally.23 For example,
15

See infra Section I.
See infra Section II.
17
See id.
18
See infra Section III.
19
See id.
20
See infra Part IV.
21
See id.
22
See infra Conclusion.
23
Kate Rogers, How E-Commerce Helps US Small Businesses Go Global,
CNBC (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/27/how-e-commerce-helpsus-small-businesses-go-global.html. “A report commissioned by eBay finds that
16
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consider the current state of the e-commerce industry. Online retailers benefit
from lower operating costs than do “brick and mortar” traditional retailers,
enabling nimble operational strategies centered around order and service
fulfillment.24 The relatively low capital expenditure costs related to online
retail sparked a dramatic rise in e-commerce revenue, and this trend is
expected to accelerate in the future.25 Predictably, demand for capital among
these retailers increased substantially as well.26
A startup can be any venture demonstrating a rapid growth stage.27 In
the venture capital industry, a startup is generally defined as an innovative
venture in its early stages of growth, with the reasonable prospect of
exponential growth of the initial investment.28 An instructive way to determine
whether a company is a startup is to consider its capital requirements and the
cycle of its business plan.29

more than 190,000—or 90 percent—of its small and medium-sized businesses used
its platform to export in 2014. To compare, in 2009, fewer than 30,000 were
exporting.” Id. Of sellers who export on eBay’s platform, 80% of them sell in more
than five export markets. Id. See also Chamber of Commerce, infra note Error!
Bookmark not defined.. “Tapping into the global digital economy is a huge
multiplier for small businesses. More than 95% of the small firms on eBay have
become exporters, and they tend to export to 25 or more countries per year.” Id.
24
See Daphne Howland, Study: Online operating costs crushing brick-andmortar retailers, RETAIL DIVE, (May 4, 2016),
https://www.retaildive.com/news/study-online-operating-costs-crushing-brick-andmortar-retailers/418613/.
25
See J. Clement, Retail e-commerce sales in the United States from 20172024, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272391/us-retail-e-commercesales-forecast/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). In 2017, online retail sales in the United
States totaled $446,811,000. Id. Online retail sales are projected to increase to
735,358,000 by 2023. Id.
26
See Mitra, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
27
Caron Beesley, How and Why to Determine If Your Business is Small,
SBA BLOGS (Jan. 10, 2019, 8:19 PM), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/how-and-whydetermine-if-your-business-small. Whether the SBA considers a business to be small
is based on the number of employees over the last year or average annual receipts for
the past three years. Id. The two most widely used standards to qualify a business as
small are 500 employees for most manufacturing and mining industries and
$7.5 million in average annual receipts for many nonmanufacturing industries.
Standards vary depending on the industry. Id.
28
See Alex Wilhelm, The Definition of a Startup in 2018 (By The
Numbers), CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/the-definition-of-a-startup/ (defining a startup as
producing less than $100 million in annual recurring revenue or $100 million in
trailing revenue, and having less than 500 employees, and having a valuation of less
than $2.5 billion).
29
See Campbell Jr., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 301.
Only 5.8% of Regulation D filings for less than one million dollars required the use
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The advent of global internet use provides an array of commercial
opportunities in the digital economy and produced a large number of startups
seeking to capitalize on this market opportunity.30 E-commerce startups are
especially well-suited for scaling in the digital economy because online-based
retailers, such as Amazon and eBay, gave startups the opportunity to reach
customers on a level previously unattainable for companies of their size.31
Indeed, sixty-six percent of startups rely on online retailer platforms to sell
their products.32
Nationally and globally integrated supply chains and the reliability of
those supply chains are also persuading many United States-based startups to
pursue global markets.33 Startups are now able to compete in the global
economy in an unprecedented manner.34 Access to new physical and virtual
markets often requires nimble access to capital markets. With a wide range of
suppliers present around the globe, retailers can utilize localized networks to
fulfill orders without a large corporate footprint.35 Other startups access social
media platforms as a means to advertise, gaining access to a global audience
that was unthinkable at the turn of the twenty-first century.36
With access to a global marketplace and supply chains to fulfill
consumer demand, startups are positioned to rapidly develop like never
before.37 Internet use is a global phenomenon, enabling startups to meet
consumer or business demands in developed and developing economies.38
Rapidly developing startups need an unprecedented amount of capital.39

of a financial mediator, such as a securities attorney, a certified public accountant, or
an investment banker. Id.
30
See Mike Dempsey, Webinar: The Changing Landscape of Global ECommerce, CB INSIGHTS (Aug. 1, 2019, 3:14 PM),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-global-ecommerce.
31
See Stephanie Pandolph, Here’s how small businesses can benefit from
online marketplaces, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-small-businesses-can-benefit-fromonline-marketplaces-2018-4. In a recent poll, about 70% of small business owners
said that online platforms like Amazon and eBay had helped then increase sales. Id.
32
See id.
33
See Rob Moffat, When should your startup expand into international
markets?, VENTURE BEAT (May 5, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/05/05/whenshould-your-startup-expand-into-international-markets/.
34
See Rogers, supra note 23.
35
See id.
36
See id. A good example of this type of business is games companies and
consumer apps that use the app stores and Facebook for distribution. Id.
37
See id.
38
See Moffat, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
39
See Howland, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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MERIT-BASED EVALUATION VERSUS MATERIAL DISCLOSURE

Blue sky and federal securities laws differ not only by jurisdiction but
also by their method of regulation.40 Federal securities laws are based on
disclosure,41 meaning securities issuers must disclose all material facts relating
to their operations or financial outlook that might reasonably form a basis for
investment or divestment.42 In contrast, most blue sky laws substantively
analyze securities’ merits.43 State regulators determine whether a security is
particularly risky, speculative, or fraudulent, and determine, based on those
factors, whether it should be issued in the state.44
Material disclosure is based on the premise that an individual,
provided with all material information, is best positioned to determine which
securities will best meet his or her financial goals.45 This approach is
epitomized at the federal level, where the issuer’s liability is determined by the
extent to which they have disclosed material information.46 A fact is material
“if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.”47

40
See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 27.03 (3d ed. 2018).
41
See 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1934).
42
TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
43
See Robert S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or
Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 105 (1987). “Merit regulation gives
a state, through its blue-sky commissioner, the authority to prevent an issuer from
selling its securities in that state when the offering or the issuer's capital structure is
substantively unfair or presents excessive risk to the investor.” Id.
44
Id.
45
See Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities
Market Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities
Law, UTAH L. REV. 101, 110 (1997).
Disclosure-based regulation implemented by the Securities Act of
1933 was premised on Justice Brandeis's notion that the availability of
information would allow the market to evaluate investments, but would not,
and should not, try to keep investors from making bad bargains. Brandeis
compared disclosure in securities to the pure food laws of the day: the laws
would not keep consumers from purchasing undesirable food—the laws
would simply help them to judge the quality of the food by disclosing the
ingredients.
Id.
46
Id.
47
TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. Whether a fact would not have caused an
investor to change his or her vote does not determine if the fact is material. A fact is
material if it would have been significant in the investor determining his or her
decision.
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Blue sky regulation is conducted by a merit analysis.48 Regulators
examining securities seek to “prevent unscrupulous dealers foisting on
inexperienced persons unfair, spurious, and worthless securities.”49 In most
states, administrative officials have substantial power to prevent a security
from being issued in their state, based on whether they believe the security is
too risky to be sold in the state.50 Officials exercise their right to deny securities
registration frequently.51 While each state has adopted a blue sky regulatory
framework, among the states the definition of “merit” regulation differs
substantially, as various states prioritize different elements of a security in
determining its risk profile.52
There are three principal ways by which states register securities in
their jurisdictions and allow for their sale in the state: registration by
notification, registration by coordination, and registration by qualification.53
Registration by notification, by far the most common form of registration,
enables a security to be sold on the basis of a notification to the state that the
issue is within a certain securities class.54 Under the Uniform Securities Act
(Uniform Act), registration by notification is available if the company “(1) has
been in continuous existence for five years (including its predecessors), (2) has
not defaulted in the past year (or in the past three years) on fixed interest,
dividend, or maturity obligations of securities, and (3) has had specified
average net earnings in the past three years.”55 However, all publicly traded

48

See COX & HAZEN, supra note 40.
Id.
50
See id.
51
See id.; see also Denos, supra note 45. A famous example of a state
regulator exercising discretion to prevent a security from being sold in their state is
the Apple IPO in 1980, where the Massachusetts Secretary of State prevented the
securities being sold in the IPO to be sold in Massachusetts due to their perceived
speculative nature. Id. While state regulation for a public offering on a national
securities exchange would now be prohibited due to the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996, the act did not exist the time. See Kevin A. Jones, The
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient
Capital Formation, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 153, 162 (2000). In contrast to the merit analysis
that the Massachusetts official conducted, a filing in a disclosure-oriented
jurisdiction would have enabled the securities to be sold in the state. See Denos,
supra note 45.
52
Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities
Offerings, 41 THE BUS. LAW. 785, 788 (1988). Some states more actively regulate
securities than others. Id. Some states do not allow for merit examination, and their
reviews are based on disclosure, a system mirroring the SEC’s. Id. Of the states that
do enable merit regulation, various methods exist. Id.
53
Cox & Hazen, supra note 40, at § 27.5.
54
See id.
55
See id.
49
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securities are exempt from registration by notification, significantly limiting
the impact of this registration method.56
Registration by coordination involves automatic enrollment when the
securities are issued under the Uniform Act, enabling coordination between
state and federal registrations.57 Registration by coordination is permitted most
commonly in conjunction with a Regulation A offering.58 While a preemptivetype registration by coordination method is a highly efficient capital
acquisition strategy, some states impose additional requirements that can
destroy the viability of registration by coordination.59
Registration by qualification is the most demanding state securities
filing, “requir[ing] filing of detailed disclosure documents in each state in
which the securities without an applicable exemption are to be offered.”60
Under the Uniform Act, there are sixteen separate forms of disclosure
required.61 Subsequent to these filings, the issuer cannot issue securities until
after the state securities administrator gives permission.62
While there have been attempts to codify state securities laws under a
common code, similar to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, such
efforts have had limited success.63 In order to reduce the substantial
discrepancies between respective states’ blue sky laws, states adopted uniform
securities regulation standards in 1930, 1956, 1980, and 2002.64 The 2002
Uniform Act made several significant changes, such as including banks within
the definition of broker-dealers, giving qualified immunity for termination
form disclosures, and harmonizing Uniform Act antifraud provisions with
56

See id.
Id.
58
See Ruthford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search
for “A Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 108 (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. §§
230.251-230.363 (2015). Registration A offers are exempted from registration and
has two offering tiers. The first tier allows raising up to $20 million over a twelvemonth period. The second tier allows raising up to $50 million over a twelve-month
period.
59
For example, some states “require that the issuer either file a qualification
registration or meet the requirements of some small or limited offering exemption
that does not permit general advertising. Either of these options effectively destroy
Regulation A as a vehicle for small businesses to use in raising capital.” Id.
60
Id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Proposals for Reform of Securities
Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 629 (2001).
64
See Securities Regulation and the Uniform Securities Act of 2002,
FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP,
https://www.faegrebd.com/en/insights/publications/2007/7/securities-regulation-andthe-uniform-securities-act-of-2002 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
57
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federal ones.65 The 2002 Uniform Act’s greatest detriment has been that in its
nearly seventeen years of existence, and despite its significant changes to the
1980 Uniform Act, only thirteen states adopted it, substantially undermining
its drafters’ intent to form a cohesive blue sky regulatory framework.66
Many commentators argue that state activism undermined the federal
government’s role in regulating securities.67 According to these critics, the
dual-regulatory system threatens economic vitality by providing an uncertain
corporate operating environment.68 In addition, some commentators argue that
the current blue sky scheme is arcane and unwieldy, imposing an undue burden
on corporations.69 They argue that corporations expend substantial resources
that could be distributed more efficiently and that would be more likely to
stimulate economic growth.70
The dual-regulatory and differing registration procedures impose
distinct capital acquisition requirements on startups conducting fundraising.71
Federal regulations, based on disclosure, and blue sky laws, based on a
substantive evaluation, present separate burdens for the fundraising entity.72
While states have sought to lessen the fundraising burden by introducing
various renditions of the Uniform Act, such efforts struggled to gain uniform
adoption.73

65

See id.
See id.
67
See Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case
for Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 304 (2003). First, SEC officials
argue that recent state actions have undermined the effectiveness of the SEC and
intruded into an area traditionally reserved for that federal body. Second, critics have
pointed out that monies collected have largely gone to the states themselves, and not
to bereaved investors. Third, commentators note that a hard-hitting enforcement
regime effectively undermines the integrity of the securities markets.
68
See id. at 304305. “[T]he threat of balkanization arises when securities
regulators at various levels act in a fragmented manner, undermining uniformity and
budding hostility among them . . . recent aggressive actions by state regulators have
largely undermined the federal government’s role as primary regulator of the
markets.” Id.
69
See generally Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., Blue-sky laws and the Recent
Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175 (1997); Rutherford B.
Campbell Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP.
L. 553 (1985).
70
See id.
71
See Karmel, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 105.
72
See Radom, supra note 67, at 304.
73
See generally Kitch, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
66
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES

States initially passed blue sky laws to address the increasing need to
protect investors from fraudulent transactions, a development inherent in
states’ traditional police power.74 Reflecting this initial concern, state
lawmakers worried, as public investing became more prevalent, “if securities
legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in
[the] state but the blue sky.”75 Because early blue sky laws impacted
investments that used instrumentalities of interstate commerce, their
constitutionality was challenged initially.76 However, the United States
Supreme Court upheld blue sky regulation as constitutional, holding the
statutes fell within the state police power.77 The Great Depression precipitated
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), as Congress recognized the need to
restore public confidence in capital markets and to address investor protection
concerns that state regulators could not.78
A. Pre-Depression Securities Laws
Prior to the Great Depression, securities were not subject to federal
regulation.79 Instead, states protected investors by a patchwork composition of
blue sky laws, with Kansas enacting the first state securities laws in 1911.80
Initial blue sky laws were a reaction not only to “fraudulent” securities
offerings but also to “highly speculative” offerings.81 Similar to the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act that later passed, blue sky laws regulated both
securities issuances, known as “licensing laws,” and fraudulent activities
related to securities after they had been issued.82 Due to political, economic,
74

See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331
(1988).
75
Id. Between 1900 and 1928, the number of securities-holders increased
from 4.4 million to 18 million, resulting in a dramatic increase in securities-related
claims and imposing political pressure on lawmakers to protect constituents. Id.
76
See generally Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
77
See id.
78
See infra note 82.
79
See Jonathan. R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 361 (1991).
80
See id.
81
Id. at 350.
82
Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 74. Regulators were empowered to act
under anti-fraud provisions only when the fraudulent activity was imminent, and
when justified, regulators could initiate investigations and enjoin fraudulent
activities. Id. Licensing activity resembled the modern state securities regulation
process, whereby regulators evaluated disclosure documents and determined the
extent to which the securities were speculative and whether they should be allowed
to be distributed to the investing public. Id.
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and administrative limitations, early blue sky laws had limited success in
combatting fraudulent offerings.83 Though there was sentiment among certain
lawmakers that the federal government should close some of the obvious holes
present in the blue sky regulatory framework, the economic expansion of the
early 1920s created a political environment that was not conducive to such
regulation.84 Prevailing adherence to laissez faire economic policies
throughout this period ensured that securities regulation was left to the states.85
B. Blue Sky Constitutionality
When they were initially challenged, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of blue sky laws.86 The Court recognized the utility
of enabling states to protect their residents.87 In Hall v. Geiger-Jones, the Court
upheld state commissioners’ right to regulate securities, reasoning that
securities regulation is a sophisticated topic, affecting a wide number of
stakeholders in a state.88 In Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., the
defendant argued that a statute criminalizing the fraudulent sale of a security
violated the Commerce Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.89 The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute under the police power, deferring to
its holding in Hall.90 In Merrick v. N.W. Hasley, the defendant argued that a
state statute forbidding sales of securities without a license and approval of a
state securities commission violated the Commerce Clause.91 As in Caldwell,
83

See id. at 331-32. Ineffectiveness of early blue-sky laws stemmed from,
among other factors: untrained attorneys were often assigned to securities regulatory
positions; changes in political administrations often meant changes among
professional regulators; individual states feared that if they imposed their securities
laws, businesses might flee to friendlier jurisdictions; and sellers often avoided states
with stringent securities regulations. Id.
84
See id. at 336. One bill “would have eliminated the largest loophole in
state blue sky laws. The bill would have made it illegal for any person to use the
mails or any facilities of interstate commerce to sell securities in any state, unless
there had been compliance with the state's blue sky laws.” Id. The bill passed the
House of Representatives but never received a vote in the Senate. Id.
85
See id. at 336-37. Although President Hoover was briefed developments
in the securities markets at the onset of the Great Depression, he maintained a
deference to state regulation of securities markets, limiting the federal government’s
response to the financial crisis. Id.
86
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 45 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
87
See Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The
Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of Primary Jurisdiction and
Preemption Challenges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 525, 529 (1997) (arguing that the Court has been very reluctant to rule state
actions unconstitutional under the Exchange Act).
88
See Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539, 553 (1917).
89
See Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564 (1917).
90
See id. at 568.
91
See Merrick v. N.W. Hasley & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 570 (1917).
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the Court deferred to its holding in Hall and held that the right to establish a
state securities commission is within the police power and does not violate the
United States Constitution.92
C. The Great Depression
The 1920s were marked by rampant and reckless securities purchases,
exacerbated by highly leveraged financing and an opaque market system.93 As
a result, “of the $50 billion in new securities offered during this period, half
became worthless.”94 The effects of the economic crisis brought public faith
in the United States capital markets to an all-time low, resulting in investors
fleeing the stock market and culminating in the New York Stock Exchange
decreasing 83% in the three years following 1929.95 In order to restore public
confidence in capital markets and to stimulate economic activity, Congress
passed the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, which currently comprise the
bulk of the federal securities regulation apparatus.96 Reflecting the prevailing
belief that the federal government’s role was to arm investors with sufficient
information to protect themselves, officials opted for a federal regulatory
system premised on disclosure.97

92

See id. at 590; see also William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in the U.S.
Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727 (2004).
93
See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (June 10, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html.
94
Id. “When the stock market crashed in October 1929, public
confidence in the markets plummeted . . . . There was a consensus that for the
economy to recover, the public's faith in the capital markets needed to be
restored.” Id.
95
Robert G. Eccles & Jean Rogers, The SEC and Capital Markets in the
21st Century: Evolving Accounting Infrastructure for Today’s World, BROOKINGS
(Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-sec-and-capital-marketsin-the-21st-century-evolving-accounting-infrastructure-for-todays-world/.
96
Id.
97
See James M. Landis, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959). In a speech prior to passage of the 1933
Securities Act, President Roosevelt stated:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or
that the properties which they represent will earn profit. There is, however,
an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in
interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information,
and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public.
Id.
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1. Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act governs the initial issuance of securities.98
Importantly, the Securities Act expressly does not preempt blue-sky laws.99
Under the statute, an individual or entity is liable if a “material fact” is stated
or omitted in the registration statement.100 A party has an affirmative defense
to liability if he or she proves they conducted a “reasonable investigation” and
there was no omission of material fact.101 Recognizing that not all securities
need to be subject to regulation, Congress included in the Securities Act §
4(a)(2), which states that “transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering” are excluded from registration requirements.102 Securities offerings
98

See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982). “Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State . . . over any person or
security . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz (1933).
100
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1933). Individuals who can be liable include:
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every
person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or
partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted; (3) every person who,
with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to
become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner; (4) every
accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named
as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as
having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with respect to such
security.
Id.
101
Id. An individual is not liable if:
after reasonable investigation, [he or she had] reasonable ground[s]
to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading.
Id. The standard for reasonableness is “that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property.” Id.
102
15 U.S.C. § 4(a)(2) (1934); see also Adam Hull & Rick Jordan,
Securities Laws, Tex. CLE Advanced Bus. L. 1 VII (2017). While there is no formal
definition for a “public offering,” there are several factors for determining under the
statute whether an offering is public: investor suitability—whether the investor is
sophisticated and has substantial financial knowledge; whether there is a limited
number of investors—there is no formal requirement under the statute, but the
offering cannot be made to an unlimited number of investors; there can be no general
solicitation and advertising; relevant financial information relating to the company
which emulates that of a public offering; the securities cannot be transferred freely;
99
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under § 4(a)(2) became known as “private offerings.”103 Private offerings are
a vital source of funding for startups.104 Section 4(a)(2) was intended to avoid
registration for offerings when registration did not advance the underlying
policy goals of the Securities Act, and it provided the basis for early restricted
offerings.105 However, because the statute did not issue significant guidance,
issuers were often on uncertain legal ground.106
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Exchange Act governs transfers of securities and entities’
disclosures regarding those securities subsequent to issuance.107 The statute is
enforced primarily through § 10(b), which states, “It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails . . . [t]o use or employ . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”108 Congress also established
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of the Exchange Act,
in order to enforce its provisions.109 Since its passage, Congress has amended
the Exchange Act, and the SEC used its rulemaking authority under the act to
adapt securities regulations to changing economic demands.110
3. The SEC
The SEC is often lauded as the most successful New Deal agency.111
Part of the SEC’s strength results from the efficiency afforded from its national

and investors must buy the securities with the intent to invest, not to sell them to a
third party. Id.
103
15 U.S.C § 4(a)(2) (1934).
104
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under
Regulation D, INVESTOR ALERTS AND BULLETINS (Sept. 24, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html. A
private offering, alternately referred to as “restricted offerings” or private
placements, is an offering that is exempt from registration requirements under the
Securities Act. Securities procured in a private offering are “restricted” in that they
cannot be sold in public markets. Id.
105
See id.
106
See id.
107
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
108
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934); see also Employment of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1948). Rule 10b-5 is the tool used most
often by SEC regulators to punish fraudsters and is derived from § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. Id.
109
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1934).
110
See generally infra Section IV.
111
See generally Phil Nicholas, The Agency That Kept Going: The Late
New Deal SEC and Shareholder Democracy, 16 J. ᴏꜰ Pᴏʟ’ʏ Hɪꜱᴛ. 212 (2004)
(discussing the widely held belief that the SEC was the most beneficial agency to be
created from the New Deal, in part because of its commitment to non-partisan
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jurisdiction, as well as its transparency and its highly skilled professionals.112
Indicative of its national presence, the SEC has eleven regional offices
throughout the country, with five functional divisions.113 In addition, the
agency oversees organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).114 The SEC has
procured settlements from fraudulent actors very successfully—completing
821 actions in 2018 alone and distributing $794,000,000 to harmed
investors.115
In passing the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Congress
recognized that states lacked the credibility, given their exposure to political
pressures, and the jurisdiction necessary to effectively regulate United States
capital markets.116 By establishing the SEC with a broad base of powers and
national jurisdiction, Congress set the SEC’s encroachment on state regulatory
power into motion, furthering what began prior to the Great Depression.117
Congress’s foresight in structuring the SEC made it one of the most effective
federal agencies, capable of nimble regulatory efforts in the global
economy.118

behavior and its statutorily mandated procedure to have at least two of five board
members to be of different parties than the majority members).
112
See generally 2019 Examination Priorities, U.S. SEC.. & EXCH. Cᴏᴍᴍ’N,
https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%202019%20Priorities.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2020) (detailing the SEC’s strategic plan and examination priorities for 2019).
113
See Summary of Performance and Financial Information, U.S. SEC.. &
EXCH. Cᴏᴍᴍ’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/2017-03/sec-summary-of-performanceand-financial-info-fy2016.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
114
See id.
115
Division of Enforcement: Annual Report (2018), U.S. SEC.. & EXCH.
Cᴏᴍᴍ’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf (last visited
Feb. 19, 2020). See also 2019 Examination Priorities, U.S. SEC.. & EXCH. Cᴏᴍᴍ’N,
https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%202019%20Priorities.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2020) (detailing the SEC’s strategic plan and examination priorities for 2019). In
2019, enforcement highlights included the following: initiating 868 enforcement
actions; obtaining judgments for penalties in excess of $4 billion; charging seventyeight parties with insider trading; pursuing actions against fourteen municipal
underwriting firms and seventy-one municipal issuers; bringing 160 cases against
investment advisers and companies; and awarding over $57 million to thirteen
whistleblowers.
116
See Eccles & Rogers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
117
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1934).
118
See generally Nicholas, supra note 111.
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FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT ON TRADITIONAL BLUE SKY
REGULATORY PURVIEW

In the 1990s, Congress began systematically curtailing states’
regulatory powers, a trend that continues today,119 by limiting the type of
issuers subject to state regulation and judicial procedures.120 Throughout this
period, Congress’s explicit policy goal has been to reduce capital acquisition
friction for corporations by streamlining the fundraising process, prohibit
certain securities litigation suits from being brought into state courts, and lower
disclosure requirements for developing corporations.121 In the Securities Act,
Congress explicitly noted that several securities classes should be exempt from
registration.122 The SEC used its rulemaking power to further clarify which
securities are exempt from registration.123 In response to the 2008 economic
collapse, Congress used lower regulatory requirements for capital acquisition
and disclosure as a means to stimulate economic activity.124
A. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) in 1995.125 The act sought to prevent securities plaintiffs from filing
frivolous claims against public corporations, which often discouraged

119

See generally Campbell Jr., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
See id.
121
See Jeremy Derman, Does the SEC Rule the Job Creation Roost?
Squaring SEC Rulemaking with the JOBS Act’s Relaxation of the Prohibition
Against General Solicitation and Advertising, 47 Sᴜꜰꜰᴏʟᴋ U.L. Rᴇᴠ. 139, 139
(2014).
122
See 15 U.S.C. § 4(a)(2) (1934).
123
See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.506 (2017).
124
See id.
125
See Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Private Securities
Litigation: The Need for Reform, 13 Sᴛ. Jᴏʜɴ’ꜱ J. Lᴇɢᴀʟ Cᴏᴍᴍᴇɴᴛ. 295, 305 (1998).
120
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disclosure.126 PSLRA instituted a uniform pleading requirement in all states.127
In addition, company representatives were no longer liable for statements
when they had no knowledge the statements were false or when statements
“were accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.”128 Due to its
“super-heightened pleading standard,” PSLRA, in conjunction with related,
subsequent legislation, has substantially reduced the number of class-action
securities suits.129 The passage of PSLRA initially appeared to achieve
policymakers’ goal of reducing frivolous lawsuits.130 However, subsequent

126

See id. at 301–303 (“Many investors filed meritless fraud claims and
‘strike suits’ against companies . . . Strike suits . . . [are] based on the allegation that
the defendant company used misleading statements to induce customers to purchase
securities . . . Strike suits are feared because of the stigma attached to defendants
charged with violations of the 1934 Act. A company that relies on investor
confidence cannot afford the consequences associated with public accusations that it
engaged in deceptive practices. Frivolous claims are even a greater nuisance for
corporations due to the prior knowledge by plaintiffs that the companies usually
settle because of the high cost of pre-trial discovery . . . These suits were often filed
by parties lacking any actual evidence of fraud. The plaintiffs often used pre-trial
discovery proceedings to go on ‘fishing expeditions’ to substantiate their claims. Due
to the high cost of discovery incurred by companies out of court, settlements were
usually favored.”).
127
Compare id. at 306. Under §10(b) of the 1934 Act, plaintiffs had to
plead specific facts that supported a “strong inference of scienter.” Id. Under Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, plaintiffs had to ‘plead fraud
with particularity,’ while ‘malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the
mind [could be] averred [to] generally.[‘]” . . . “[t]he standard adopted by the
PSLRA mirrored the section 10(b) approach.” with Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA
Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena
with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 Washburn L.J. 413, 423 (2005). In PLSRA,
Congress imposed a more stringent pleading standard:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.
Id.
128
Id. at 307.
129
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L. J. 1, 11 (2010). Claims are often
dismissed “on complex questions such as scienter, loss causation, reliance, and
materiality—questions that formerly would have been considered trial worthy.” Id.
130
See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation And
Its Lawyers: Changes During The First Decade After The PSLRA, 106 Columbia L.
Rev. 1489, 1496 (2006)
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changes to securities laws that preempted state court jurisdiction returned the
number of securities suits filed in federal courts to a pre-PSLRA level.131
B. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress indicated a shift in its intent to take public offerings
out of state regulatory jurisdiction when it passed the National Securities
Market Improvement Act (NSMIA) in 1996, an amendment to the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.132 NSMIA
streamlines securities regulation by placing “covered securities” exclusively
in the federal domain.133 Although the NSMIA reduced the scope of state
regulators’ authority, it preserved the states’ traditional police power role.134
However, Congress was careful to explicitly limit state regulatory authority in
131
See id. at 1497-1500. Several other changes resulted from the passage of
PSLRA: less lower-value claims are being filed; while most cases continue to settle
out of court, the time between filing and settling has lengthened; because less lowervalue claims are being brought, the mean settlement amount has risen; investors are
regaining a smaller percentage of losses; and the number of cases brought in the
Ninth Circuit and against Silicon Valley technology companies have dropped. Id.
132
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1996). See also Securities and Exchange
Commission, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, Fast Answers (Aug. 24,
2019, 9:23 PM), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 “regulates the organization of companies,
including mutual funds, that engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading
in securities, and whose own securities are offered to the investing public.” Id. The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 “regulates investment advisers. With certain
exceptions, this Act requires that firms or sole practitioners compensated for
advising others about securities investments must register with the SEC and conform
to regulations designed to protect investors.” Id.
133
Id. A security is “covered” if it is listed on a national stock exchange,
registered by an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, or
is sold to a qualified purchaser. See also Jones, Kevin A., The National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53
Ark. L.R. 152, 162 (2000). Covered securities include most exempted securities
under §3(a) of the Securities Act, which includes,
[C]ertain government and bank securities, securities issued by
certain pension, profit-sharing and similar plans, notes having a maturity of
less than nine months, interests in railroad equipment trusts, certain
certificates issued in a case under Title 11, and certain insurance, endowment,
or annuity contracts.” Covered securities are exempt primarily because “of
the character of the issuer, such as government securities, or because of the
existence of some other regulatory structure that adequately protects
investors.”
Id.
134
See id. “. . . the securities commission (or any agency or officer
performing like functions) of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of
such State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or
deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or
securities transactions.” Id.
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order to eliminate any implied means of regulation.135 The passage of NSMIA
resulted in blue sky laws being inapplicable to nearly all publicly traded
securities beyond notice or coordinated filings.136
C. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
The passage of PSLRA remedied many of the maladies its drafters
hoped to address, but it spawned a particularly significant and unintended
consequence, as many plaintiffs chose to avoid the uniform pleading
requirement by filing their claims in state court.137 To prevent this perceived
loophole, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA) in 1998. 138 SLUSA bars certain state law-based class action suits.139
In addition, SLUSA mandates that a federal court must determine whether the
statute precludes the action from being brought in state court.140 Demonstrating
135

See Jones, Kevin A., The National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53 Ark. L.R. 152, 162
(2000). Legislative history reflects Congress’s intent to “eliminate States' authority
to require or otherwise impose conditions on the disclosure of any information for
covered securities.” Id.
136
See Cox & Hazen, supra note 40.
137
See id.
138
See Selby P. Brown, Don’t Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water: The
Merits of the Intermediate Approach to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 363, 375 (2014).
139
See id. (internal citations omitted) “[P]laintiffs are barred from bringing
‘class-actions that (1) consist of more than fifty prospective members; (2) assert
state-law claims; (3) involve a nationally listed security; and (4) allege ‘an untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of’
that security.’” But see Michael B. de Leeuw Why Are There Still So Many State Law
Security Cases, Aspatore 1, 3 (2016):
The Delaware Carve-Out exempts an otherwise covered class action
if the claim arises from the statutory law or common law of the state in which
the issuer is incorporated and if the claim involves (i) “the purchase or sale
of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to
holders of equity securities of the issuer” or (ii) “any recommendation,
position, or other communication with respect to the sale of securities of the
issuer that (I) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer
to holders of equity securities of the issuer; and (II) concerns decisions of
those equity holders with respect to voting their securities, acting in response
to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights.”
The cases brought under Delaware Carve-Out are, broadly speaking, M&A
cases—cases that challenge aspects of mergers and other deals, usually styled
as breaches of fiduciary duty claims on the basis, for example, that the price
paid was too low or that inadequate disclosures were given to shareholders.
Id.
140
See id. at 376-77. This is because a narrow reading of the statute would
undermine the utility of the statute and would not remedy the harm it was intended to
combat. Id.
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Congress’s intent that the covered securities from NSMIA be preempted under
federal law, SLUSA re-affirms that covered securities are not subject to state
law.141
D. Regulation D
Seeking to clarify registration exemptions pursuant to § 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, the SEC used its rulemaking power to exempt certain
transactions from the purview of the blue sky laws, in what is known as
“Regulation D.”142 The regulation is broken into five pertinent rules.143 While
Regulation D was initially hailed as a useful capital acquisition tool, some blue
sky laws have prevented startups from having easier access to capital, as was
originally intended.144 The regulation’s underwhelming impact can be
attributed to applicable blue sky laws’ mitigating effect.145 Indeed, Regulation

141

See Rutherford B. Campbell Jr. The Role of Blue-sky laws and NSMIA
and the JOBS Act, 36 No. 6 Banking & Fin. Services Pol'y Rep. 15 (2007). “The
adoption of SLUSA makes largely irrelevant the impact if any of NSMIA on private
actions under state blue-sky laws as the covered securities of NSMIA in large part
are the covered securities of SLUSA.” Id.
142
15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1934).
143
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2017). Rule 501 defines an “accredited
investor” as a bank, financial institution, investment institution, or 501(c) entity with
over $5,000,000 in assets or a singular individual with net assets excluding his or her
home exceeding $1,000,000 or an individual whose income for the last two years has
exceeded $200,000 and whose income is reasonably expected to exceed that amount
in the future. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2017). Rule 502 determines whether the
party raising funds is abusing the exemption by examining whether different rounds
of capital acquisition should be integrated and exceed the allotment. Id. See 17 C.F.R
§ 230.503 (2017). Rule 503 requires that the issuer notify the SEC within 15 days
after issuance of the securities that the party has issued exempted securities. Id. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2017). Rule 504 enables a company to issue up to $5,000,000
but it does not pre-empt state law. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017). Rule 506
enables a company to sell an unlimited number of restricted securities to accredited
investors and to sell the securities to up to thirty-five unaccredited investors. Id.
144
See Campbell Jr., supra note 14, at 291.
In short, state blue sky laws have wrecked the sensible, balanced and
efficient regime that the Commission enacted in Regulation D. What is
interesting and, indeed, unfortunate for small issuers and the economy
generally is that the Commission, which acted so appropriately in the
construction of Regulation D, has without even a whimper of protest
permitted the beneficial effects of Regulation D to be largely neutralized in
this manner, making it more difficult for issuers, especially small issuers, to
find the capital they need to do business.
Id.
145
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500. “Nothing in Regulation D obviates the need to
comply with any applicable state law relating to the offer and sale of securities.” Id.
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D states that “special attention” should be given to relevant state laws and
regulations.146
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts certain securities
issuances from regulation.147 As part of Regulation D, Rule 506 expands
capital acquisition capabilities for restricted offerings by enabling companies
to sell securities to an unlimited number of investors and up to thirty-five
unaccredited investors, as well as allowing for unlimited solicitation to all
investors.148 To qualify for the exemption, an issuer must satisfy the
requirements of Rule 501 and 502.149 The introduction of Rule 506, and
particularly § 506(c), which allows for unlimited investor solicitation, was met
with great fanfare by the investing community, who expected it to provide a
capital boon to startups.150 However, an overwhelming majority of issuers
continue to rely on Rule 506(b) as their primary means of private
placements.151 According to a 2015 study, less than 11% of issuers utilized
Rule 506(c) for their private offering.152 Despite the expectations to the
146

Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 4(a)(2) (1934).
148
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017).
149
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2017); Rule 502 requires that “[a]ll sales
that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all terms and conditions of
Regulation D. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2017). See also 17 CFR § 230.501 (2017).
Under Rule 501, an accredited investor is:
Any bank as defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act, or any savings
and loan association or other institution as defined in section 3(a)(5)(A) of
the Act whether acting in its individual or fiduciary capacity . . . Any private
business development company as defined in section 202(a)(22) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . Any organization described in section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . with total assets in excess of
$5,000,000 . . . Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive
officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer . . . any natural
person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's
spouse, exceeds $1,000,000; Any natural person who had an individual
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint
income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years
and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the
current year . . . Any trust, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not
formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose
purchase is directed by a sophisticated person as described in §
230.506(b)(2)(ii); and [a]ny entity in which all of the equity owners are
accredited investors.
Id.
150
See Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of Publicly Offered
Private Placements, 68 SMU L. Rev. 899, 900 (2015).
151
See id.
152
Id. at 902, 905. Filings using Rule 506(b) constituted 73.84% of private
placements during the same period. Id. Rule 506(b) offerings raised over $858
147
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contrary, issuers continue to use Rule 506(b) for a variety of reasons, including
a lack of familiarity with Rule 506(c) and general solicitation not being
required to meet their capital needs.153
E. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012
In 2011, in an attempt to stimulate the United States economy
following the economic collapse of 2008, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act), which amended § 2(a) of the
Securities Act.154 The Act is designed to stimulate the growth of “Emerging
Growth Companies”155 by lowering their reporting requirements.156 In an
effort to promote investment in Emerging Growth Companies, Congress
directed the SEC to modify Regulation D to allow general solicitation and
advertisement to individuals and institutions who are not sophisticated
investors.157 Congress also sought to accelerate the growth of Emerging
Growth Companies by significantly streamlining and limiting reporting
requirements during the registration and early growth stage of the company.158
Recognizing that Emerging Growth Companies are in a crucial growth stage,
Congress limited for five years the companies’ reporting requirements until
billion during the time in question while Rule 506(c) offerings sold over $22 billion.
Id.
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they reached a mature financial level and can sustain compliance costs more
easily, and Congress preempted blue sky regulations for Emerging Growth
Companies while they were labeled as such.159
By passing a plethora of acts, beginning with PSLRA in 1995,
Congress has substantially limited blue sky regulatory power, to the point of
rendering it toothless regarding most securities issuances.160 While blue sky
regulation remains potent, it does so by mounting administrative hurdles to
capital acquisition, even as its substantive regulatory power is increasingly
limited.161 Congress has increasingly sought to use regulatory relief as a means
of economic stimulation, and this trend will likely continue to limit the
remnants of regulatory authority state regulators maintain.162 Congress’s
encroachment has resulted in blue sky laws that are progressively limited in
jurisdiction but which can be a substantial hurdle for startups subject to their
regulation.163
V.

THE CASE FOR COMPLETING THE DEMISE OF BLUE SKY LAWS

State securities regulators will never be able to match the efficiency of
a national regulatory agency like the SEC.164 While states have struggled to
adopt the Uniform Act of 2002, the SEC is efficiently coordinated within its
five divisions and maintains supervision of various agencies that assist in
fulfilling its mission.165 Congress has demonstrated a willingness to encroach
further and further on traditional state regulatory and judicial jurisdiction.166
Its actions have left state securities regulators with increasingly limited
jurisdiction, but with the ability to be a substantial roadblock for entities within
their regulatory purview.167
A. Economic Efficiency of a Single Regulatory Regime
Federal regulation should preempt state securities regulation because
of its unparalleled ability to efficiently regulate capital markets in comparison
to the fifty individual state jurisdictions.168 The SEC is perhaps the most widely
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respected agency to result from the New Deal.169 It is widely lauded as a model
federal agency that is, to a degree, insulated from external political pressure,
an issue that can plague state regulators, through its appointment of bipartisan
commissioners.170 Because it is the preeminent securities regulatory body in
the country, its methods of regulation and its standard practices have been
thoroughly vetted, and when problematic for investors, challenged.171 The
stable and predictable nature of the SEC provides a financial climate
conducive to growth for startups and established industry players.172
The federal government as one entity can be, and has proven to be,
significantly more flexible in responding to investors’ needs than the fifty
states are.173 Statutes such as PSLRA, SLUSA, NMSIA, and the JOBS Act
indicate that the SEC is attuned to national investor concerns, as well as the
national and international economic challenges faced by companies seeking to
raise capital.174 Because of its national perspective, the SEC, in conjunction
with Congress, can tailor solutions that serve the national economy best and
enable American corporations to compete in the global economy.175 Even if
one or more states are attuned to startups’ capital markets challenges, it is
unlikely that each state will respond in kind and in the most efficient way
possible, as demonstrated by the inability to coordinate their state securities’
apparatuses.176 Therefore, due to the SEC’s and Congress’s national
perspective and demonstrated willingness to confront issues of national scale,
federal regulators are far better equipped to handle capital acquisition issues
in the interconnected national economy.177
The inefficiency of a regulatory jurisdiction divided into fifty separate
components has not been sufficiently curtailed by the passage of uniform
securities acts, the most recent act being passed in 2002.178 Perhaps
recognizing the untenable nature of a regulatory scheme in a global economy
that is divided into fifty jurisdictions, state regulators have attempted in 1930,
1956, 1980, and 2002 to provide a common basis of regulation by creating a
uniform regulatory system.179 However, demonstrating states’ inability to
coordinate for the sake of economic efficiency, in the seventeen years since its
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passage, only thirteen states have actually adopted the most recent Uniform
Securities Act of 2002.180
The attempt to maintain a semblance of a uniform securities regime
among states begs the question as to the purpose of such a regulatory tool when
a more efficient and coordinated one has already been established at the federal
level.181 Setting aside the merits of the regulation for a moment, the greater
concern is rooted in the fact that startups who are most likely to be subject to
state regulation, due to not being covered securities under NSMIA, are left to
grapple with the uncertainty about regulatory variances from state to state.182
Particularly in an economy where most startups, through platforms such as
Amazon or eBay, are able to establish a substantial sales presence in every
state, being unable to tap a potential pool of investors in every state can have
a deleterious impact and can result in lost capital acquisition opportunities.183
Therefore, the inability of state regulators to collaborate regarding the bases of
state securities regulation imposes a substantial opportunity cost on
corporations who need capital most.184
With fifty different state regulatory bodies, separate bureaucratic
systems, and different electoral concerns, the likelihood of inefficient capital
acquisition policies among the states is increased by a factor of fifty.185
Because startups often lack the sufficient number of personnel qualified to
grapple with a diverse range of regulations, capital that could be spent in
growing operations will often be spent on compliance and regulatory experts,
decreasing the entity’s efficient use of capital.186 In contrast, many large
regional, national, or multinational companies face similar legal and
compliance challenges.187 However, due to substantially higher operating
budgets, large companies’ growth is less likely to be inhibited by the funds
spent on complying with securities regulations.188 A single regulatory
authority at the federal level will reduce this latent inefficiency inherent in the
dual-regulatory model.189
A singular regulatory regime will provide more opportunity to noninstitutional investors resulting from the concentration of information and
regulations in a single place.190 One of the heaviest burdens for a startup
180
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regarding state securities regulation is the uncertainty about how the state will
enforce its regulations and the political pressures associated with such
enforcement.191 Particularly for entities that cannot afford the substantial legal
costs that are associated with a dual-regulatory system, they could be more
likely to enter into the capital acquisition space, which could lead to economic
growth opportunities for both investors and the businesses.192 If startups are
required to consider only the effects of federal regulation, they will preserve
the cash flows and operational costs associated with such expenditures and
spend the capital on growing their capabilities.193 Regulating securities only at
the federal level will provide issuers with confidence and certainty about the
regulations they are likely to encounter.194
States’ securities authority is already substantially limited to the point
where the burden of blue sky regulation outweighs their utility.195 States have
almost no regulatory authority over national corporations, whose securities are
“covered” and subject only to federal regulation.196 The SEC has proven to be
substantially proficient in regulating national and multinational corporations
and disclosures.197 While states can, through merit evaluation, ferret out
patently fraudulent issuances, a federal regulator is just as likely to be able to
do so, and the efficiency afforded by operating on a national scale means that
investors throughout the rest of the country will reap the benefits from a
streamlined and standardized process.198
B. Preempting Blue Sky Laws as a Natural Continuation of
Congressional Policy
Congress has recognized that the dual-federal and state securities
regulatory system limits startups’ growth potential at a crucial stage.199 The
NSMIA was an early attempt to limit the scope of state regulation in favor of
capital efficiency.200 Covered securities under the statute are those that are
already subject to regulation or are likely to be safe investments due to the
character of the issuance.201 Recognizing the inefficient nature of dualregulation for public companies, Congress sought to improve capital
efficiency by eliminating what it perceived as unnecessary double
191
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regulation.202 Similarly, in passing SLUSA, Congress sought to limit the effect
of strike suits, recognizing that corporations spend capital in more efficient
ways when they are not fighting strike suits in the discovery phase or settling
with plaintiffs.203 In passing the JOBS Act, Congress recognized that the
regulatory burden on Emerging Growth Companies prevented them from
maturing when they were at a crucial stage of development.204 Importantly,
Congress saw the need to explicitly give an exception to Emerging Growth
Companies regarding state securities regulation. Acknowledging that limiting
regulation for this class of growing companies would mean more efficient
capital utilization, Congress substantially decreased developing companies’
reporting requirements.205
Congress revisited the concept of making capital markets more
efficient by limiting states’ judicial jurisdiction by first passing the PSLRA in
1995 and later SLUSA in 1998.206 Recognizing that plaintiff strike suits
constituted a form of corporate harassment and that corporations could allot
capital with more efficiency than defending against meritless claims, Congress
sought to eliminate this abuse by instituting uniform pleading requirements.207
However, plaintiffs recognized an inefficiency in this new regulation and
simply began avoiding the new pleading requirements by filing in state courts,
the dual-regulatory system once again imposing substantial litigation costs on
corporate interests.208 SLUSA was a response to this perceived inefficiency by
precluding all class-actions suits with more than fifty members, asserting statelaw claims, involving a nationally listed security and which allege an omission
or untrue statement related to the purchase or sale of a security.209 SLUSA,
then, moved a substantial amount of state regulatory power to federal courts
and, operating in conjunction with the PSLRA, limits the impact of any
potential state claim.210
Because class action suits are composed of a large number of retail
investors, those individuals whom blue sky laws purport to protect most,
SLUSA’s removal of regulatory authority from the states significantly
undermines this fundamental blue sky regulatory goal.211 Since class action
suits involving less than fifty plaintiffs are the only suits that can be brought
in state court, sophisticated investors are the parties most likely to bring a claim
202
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in state court, since most class action suits are brought on behalf of retail
investors.212 Rather ironically, sophisticated investors are the parties least
likely to require the protection of a merit-based regulatory system, since such
investors are capable of performing sophisticated legal and financial analyses
themselves.213 The Delaware carve-out exception demonstrates this irony.214
These cases, based in state statutory or common law, most often involve
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which nearly always involve sophisticated
investors.215 Therefore, an inefficiency exists between blue-sky laws, which
purport to protect investors on the merits of a security, and who logically must
therefore be relatively unsophisticated investors, and those who actually bring
most of the suits in state court—sophisticated investors engaged in M&A
activity.216 Protection from blue-sky laws does not flow to vulnerable retail
investors but instead to institutional parties or high net worth individuals under
Rule 501.217
C. Federal Regulation’s Evolving Role in Relation to Blue Sky Laws’
Purpose
Blue sky laws no longer serve the essential purpose their initial
proponents envisioned.218 Initial blue sky laws were the only legal remedy for
investors who had been swindled out of their money by fraudsters.219 In
contrast, today the SEC provides a sophisticated regulatory body that is
substantially capable of efficiently ensuring that investors are protected, while
avoiding inhibiting capital formation.220 The blue sky framework has outlived
its benefits, and it is a relic of economies past.221
While eliminating blue sky regulation would promote substantial
gains in regulatory efficiency, it could eliminate states’ role in protecting their
residents from fraudulent transactions, a role the Supreme Court has found to
be integral, regardless of its effects on interstate commerce.222 As the Court
reasoned, states are uniquely positioned to understand the particular challenges
facing their residents, and their proximity to state residents can enable them to
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provide additional investor protection.223 Fraudulent securities issuances could
be concentrated in a particular state, imposing an outsized effect on that state
in comparison to the rest of the economy, particularly in sales of restricted
securities.224
Blue sky laws were born out of the idea that, without state intervention
and protection, investors would be vulnerable to manipulative enterprises.225
The Supreme Court determined in early cases involving blue sky
constitutionality that the police power should be preserved.226 However, the
passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, and the many statutes and
regulations which have passed subsequent to those statutes, have eliminated
the purpose for which blue sky laws were created initially.227 As the federal
government’s reach has increasingly limited the scope of state regulation, state
regulatory authority has shrunk.228 With this decrease, blue sky laws’ existence
is increasingly difficult to justify, especially when compared to the actual and
opportunity costs of the dual-regulatory system upon business interests.229 For
instance, the passage of PSLRA, NSMIA, and SLUSA has resulted in a
dramatic drop-off in securities claims brought in state court.230
D. The Blue Sky Swiss Cheese Dilemma
The number of corporate actions and parties exempted from state
regulation creates a troublesome cost–benefit analysis for blue sky laws’
continued utility.231 Since the passage of PSLRA in 1995, Congress has
continued to poke holes in states’ regulatory sphere.232 The NSMIA
effectively removed most publicly traded securities out states’ regulatory
purview.233 SLUSA and PSLRA have resulted in most securities lawsuits
being removed to federal court, especially since most class action suits are not
worth pursuing if there are less than fifty plaintiffs.234 The JOBS Act further
223
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reduced states’ regulatory authority by preempting state authority in many
instances of restricted offerings.235
The SEC, through its national presence and coordination with national
agencies, provides an unparalleled regulatory efficiency that states will never
be able to match by coordinating among themselves.236 Congress, through
enactment of acts such as PSLRA, NSMIA, SLUSA, and the JOBS Act, among
others, has increasingly rendered state regulators toothless, resulting in blue
sky laws’ value being substantially less than the investor protection they
provide.237 As federal lawmakers and regulators continue their assault on
traditional state jurisdiction, the essential purposes for which blue sky laws
were founded—investor protection from fraudulent actors—is now being
robustly fulfilled by the SEC and its component agencies and divisions.238
While state regulators once fulfilled a vital and constitutionally sanctioned role
in protecting investors, that role, where it is not preempted, is merely
duplicative, resulting in substantial regulatory inefficiency.239
CONCLUSION
In no way does this Comment argue for decreased investor protection.
However, the Comment does advocate for a more efficient regulatory system,
which will effectively police securities issuances while avoiding hindering
startup growth. In the digital economy, where multi-billion-dollar companies
develop in a matter of months, the United States’ dual-regulatory regime is
woefully unequipped for competition in the modern economy.240 An unwieldy
and cumbersome tool, blue sky laws risk damaging startups’ growth prospects
by hampering their ability to raise capital efficiently.241 It can be tempting to
carve out another exception to blue sky regulation, but such a proposal would
not address the underlying structural concern regarding blue sky laws and
capital acquisition.242 The patchwork regulatory framework provides little
investor protection in comparison to the hurdle it can present for startups
raising capital.243
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Paternalistic, merit-based regulation is best-suited to protect
individuals who are not capable of making such assessments themselves, such
as retail investors possessing small amounts of capital.244 However, such
investors are likely to be weeded out by capital requirements, such as those
under Rule 501,245 especially since most public securities will be considered
covered under NSMIA and SLUSA.246 With the federal government’s
increasing encroachment on investor protection, and the efficient manner in
which it can operate, the time has passed for state regulators to stop imposing
inefficiencies on the national economy.247
While blue sky laws provided a valuable service in protecting
investors in the past, the scope of securities regulation in the global economy
has outgrown regional regulatory efforts and the police power.248 Furthermore,
federal government entities are capable of completing the tasks states have
sought to preserve for themselves, with substantially more efficiency.249
Because state regulatory efforts have had a discriminatory effect against
startups and startups by limiting their ability to acquire capital, all state blue
sky laws should be preempted by federal securities regulation.250
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The pernicious effect of state registration rules is easily and vividly
demonstrated . . .
It is impossible, however, to find any material benefit in such a
regulatory system. If state registration authority were eliminated, investors
would still be protected by federal registration provisions and by both state
and federal antifraud requirements. Imposing on top of these protections 50
separate state registration regimes administered under each separate state’s
registration rules and by each separate state’s securities administrators adds
no material protection for investors. It does, however, significantly increase
the issuer’s offering costs to an extent that may make access to capital more
difficult. While state registration requirements in all cases amount to
economic waste, they are especially debilitating for small businesses. This is
the result of the structural and economic circumstances that small businesses
face when they attempt to access external capital. Id.

